Arsenal 2-3 West Bromwich Albion: Thomas excellent against Arsenal

Arsenal expected to beat West Brom on Saturday, but instead West Bromwich Albion pulled off a shock, deservedly winning 3-2.

Both teams lined up in a similar 4-2-3-1, with WBA playing with a more compact midfield with the pace of Jerome Thomas on the left and Peter Odimwingie upfront always being a counter attacking threat.

WBA Pressing

West Brom started well and forced a lot of errant passes from Arsenal. This was because of West Brom's pressing, which Roberto Di Matteo revealed later, was there gameplan. They front players didn't give the defenders or defensive midfielders time to pick a pass to one of the attacking players, meaning that Arsenal moves broke down early, or ended up in loss of possession. West Brom's pressing did, however, leave space behind their defence that Arsenal were unable to exploit because of the lack of time to play a killer pass.

Arsenal Defensive Frailties

Arsenal's defence did not have a good game on Saturday. In the first half the defence played a high line, leaving them susceptible to through balls, like the one from Chris Brunt that found Peter Odimwingie and forced a penalty. In the second half, Arsenal were again undone by pace, as Jerome Thomas skinned Bacary Sagna, and crossed for Odimwingie to poke home. It was a good cross and good wing play, but no Arsenal defender tracked the run of Odimwingie. 2 minutes later, Brunt backheeled past Clichy, Koscielny didn't close down Jara and Almunia palmed it into his own net. That was the highlighted error, but just as bad was Koscielny's failure to close down Jara and force him out wide, and also Song's positioning was awful. Wilshere and Rosicky came on for the ineffectual Eboue and Diaby and Vela came on for Koscielny. WBA then scored again, Brunt evading Song's challenge and beating Almunia to the ball before crossing for Thomas to tap in. It was again poor goalkeeping by Almunia, but again not one defender tracked the run of Thomas and Song's defending was again poor.

Nasri immiedietly responded for Arsenal, who started to look more dangerous. Arshavin came into the center, Nasri had a drifting role, with Vela trying to cross from the left. Wilshere came on for Diaby and played a lot better than the Frenchman had, though WBA did allow more space as they sat back. Nasri would score again, but Arsenal were unable to score a third.

Conclusion

Arsenal were undone by pace and pressing today. West Brom pressedm rather like Sunderland did last week. Both teams didn't allow Arsenal time on the ball, which meant that Arsenal didn't really start to dominate until later in the match when the opposition tired. Arsenal will have to find some way to relieve the pressure. One way to relieve pressure is pace, and it would've been interesting to see if the pace of Walcott could've exploited the space behind West Brom's back line.
Arsenal's high defensive line meant they were susceptible to the pace of Thomas and Odemwingie, and it was those two, along with Chris Brunt, that caused the most damage for Arsenal. The fullbacks were paticularly bad, with Thomas and Brunt regularly getting the better of Sagna and Clichy. Whatever may happen in the following months for West Brom, this was a match they thoroughly deserved to win.

Are Arsenal playing a 4-2-2-2?

With the absence of Theo Walcott, Tomas Rosicky came into the first XI on Saturday. Rosicky is a different player to Walcott, and looks to come inside more than Walcott.
At times, it looked like Arsenal were playing a Spanish like 4-2-3-1/4-2-2-2, with Rosicky joining Fabregas.

Let's look at the 3rd Arsenal goal
Here, Rosicky and Denilson (black underlined) are the 2 deepest midfielders, while Fabregas and Song (in red) are the two furthest. Arshavin is out of picture, and Chamakh is in green.
With Rosicky tucking in, there's noone on the right wing, and Arshavin is on the left, but drifting in. This is similar to Spain's system early in the World Cup; Villa nominally on the left but cutting in, Torres up front, Iniesta nominally on the right cutting in to the middle with Xavi and Sergio and Alonso holding. It's a similar system here (though Song is not an attacking midfielder)
Here, Arshavin has joined the attack, giving Arsenal 2 defined front players and 2 defined attacking midfielders. To me, the formation seems a 4-2-2-2. While that formation can create natural width by players finding space, and some wonderful football (it was used by Brazil in 1982), the lack of a direct outlet on the right could hinder Arsenal, which is why it's important the fullbacks can deliver good crosses when they do get forward, or Arsenal have a direct outlet like Walcott available.

Subsittutes change the game for Arsenal

It took Arsenal a long time to break down the organised Liverpool defence on Sunday afternoon, but the introduction of Robin van Persie, Tomas Rosicky and Theo Walcott changed the game for the Gunners.
The introduction of that trio gave Arsenal more options, and Arsenal got the ball into the box more after Rosicky came on, replacing the ineffectual Wilshere.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Here, the introduction of Theo Walcott gave Arsenal a more direct outlet on the right, and, coupled with Walcott's pace, it forced Liverpool to defend deeper, making more space for Arsenal to work in.


by Guardian Chalkboards


Finally, the introduction of Van Persie meant that he became the link up forward off Chamakh, leaving Chamakh the target man, leading to the goal that Arsenal scored.

On a defensive note, Laurent Koscielny had a superb game for Arsenal; he won 5 out of 6 tackles (including 4 out of 5 in the air) made 4 out of 5 clearaances successfully, and his passing from the back was superb, with his 1 unsuccessful pass coming in Liverpool's penalty box. It was a superb debut for the Frenchman, who gives Arsenal the kind of centre-half that they need.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Death of the Poacher or ode to Kevin Phillips

Many positions in football have died over the years. Wingers became useless in the 4-3-1-2, the 3-5-2 became rare and so did the sweeper, and now the poacher is joining them on the scrap heap. Poachers aren't completely dead, but the poaching sort of player like Michael Owen, Robbie Fowler and Ruud Van Nistelrooy do not exist at top level clubs. Owen played with United this season, and scored a few goals, one which was a classic poachers goal, against Manchester City. Poachers no longer work for good teams because besides putting away chances they don't add anything else to team play, unlike a false nine or more complete forward does.

False Nine/More complete striker vs The poacher
One reason for the death of the poacher is that false nines and more compete strikers simply add more. They create chances by dropping deep, like Wayne Rooney, Robin van Persie and Lionel Messi do, and allowing midfielders to make runs into the box. There is also the Big Man holding the ball up and creating chances, like Emile Heskey, Carlton Cole, Bobby Zamora and Peter Crouch, who is 7th in assists, and 11th in chances created. The poacher usually doesn't create chances unless he has pace and can use it to create chances like Michael Owen did in his hey day. However, if the poacher doesn't have pace, he's not going to create chances by getting into the box or sitting on the shoulder of the last defender; he may score the chances, but he won't create them.
What Can the Poacher do?
The poacher still has some value, though not for the top teams. One example is Kevin Phillips, whose 250th career goal, which came for Birmingham against Arsenal, showed the value of a poacher. Despite the goal coming off his nose or shoulder, he got into the box, and he finished a chance. Poachers still have some value for a midtable or lower team, or for a team that isn't playing well and needs the goals. A case in point is Darren Bent, who Tottenham seemed quite happy to go, despite him being their top scorer. The reason is with Pavlyuchenko, Crouch, Defoe and Keane they had more complete strikers; of all strikers, Defoe is 14th in assists, while Bent is 47th, with only one.
The poacher isn't dead, not by a long shot, but the days of a poacher being at a top club, like Ian Wright at Arsenal, Van Nistelrooy at United and Fowler and Owen at Liverpool are over.

The reason for the title being "ode to Kevin Phillips": Phillips is one of those poachers, and despite 36, has still has the quickness to score goals, and now has 250 in his career. He never played for a top team, but put together a good career, and is the kind of player whose breed is dying.

Pressing, and what can Arsenal learn from Barcelona?

Think back to Arsenal's first match of the season: 6-1 away to Everton. While the result was remarkable for the amount of goal's that Arsenal scored it was also remarkable for the way Arsenal pressed. Everton were hardly allowed time on the ball, and they gave the ball away a lot. One example of a goal created by pressing was Arsenal's fourth: Arshavin won it from Hibbert, and Arsenal were away. Pressing continued against Portsmouth, Celtic, Man United and Man City, and Arsenal were fairly unlucky to lose in those last 2 games. Yet, what has happened to the pressing that Arsenal employed earlier in the season?

In a recent article in the Guardian, tactical genius, and author of the excellent book, Inverting the Pyramid, Jonathan Wilson discussed pressing. He writes here

"Without the ball," Pep Guardiola said after last season's Champions League final, "we are a disastrous team, a horrible team, so we need the ball." It is a sentence that could equally be used of Arsenal: of course they are much better in possession than out of it. The difference is that Barcelona are much better at regaining possession than Arsenal.

After 20 minutes last Wednesday, Barcelona had had 72% of the possession, a barely fathomable figure against anybody, never mind against a side so noted for their passing ability as Arsenal. Their domination in that area came not so much because they are better technically – although they probably are – but because they are better at pressing. In that opening spell, Barça snapped into tackles, swirled around Arsenal, pressured them even deep in their own half. It was a remorseless, bewildering assault; there was no respite anywhere on the pitch, not even when the ball was rolled by the goalkeeper to a full-back just outside the box.

He then further goes on to describe pressing, as quoted from Valeryi Lobanovskyi, the father of modern day pressing:

In The Methodological Basis of the Development of Training Models, the book he co-wrote with Anatoliy Zelentsov, Lobanovskyi lays out three different kinds of pressing. There is full-pressing, when opponents are hounded deep in their own half; half-pressing, when opponents are closed down only as they cross halfway; and there is false pressing, when a team pretends to press, but doesn't – that is, one player would close down the man in possession, while the others would sit off.

It is full-pressing that Arsenal employed in the opening matches, and through that they had a lot of the ball; even away to Manchester United they had 53% possession, and away to Manchester City they also had 53% possession. However, injuries, tiredness, and players playing unfamiliar roles, like Arshavin at centre forward, meant that the full pressing went out the window.

There are also obvious problems with full pressing, and a perfect example of the problems are in the 2-2 draw with Barcelona. When teams full press, they become vulnerable to quick counter attacks, or long balls over the top. Full pressing also makes a team get tired, which is why Barcelona were not as good for the final 20 minutes as they were for the first 70 in that 2-2 draw, and they were vulnerable to the quick pace of Theo Walcott. Arsenal have also been vulnerable to quick counter attacks when pressing, as against Manchester City, Chelsea, Everton in that 2-2 draw, Manchester United, and Chelsea again. After that last Chelsea game, Arsene Wenger made a bit of a switch, pushing Cesc Fabregas up, and also not having players full press. Arsenal false pressed more often, and while they didn't concede as many, they didn't score as many, evident by the amount of late goals we've had to score this year. Against Barcelona though, we couldn't get away with not full pressing, as they had all the time in the world on the ball, and they punished us, scoring 6 in 2 games. We were also punished against Tottenham and Wigan; Danny Rose had a lot of time for his first goal, even though it was a wonder strike, and against Wigan, in those final 10 minutes, Wigan had lots of time on the ball (see their first goal, and their third), though that can also be attributed to lack of mental focus.

So what's next for Arsenal, mainly, what kind of pressing should they do next year? Obviously, full pressing, while extremely effective is also hard to do for 90 minutes. For an answer to that, I'll turn again to Wilson:

Particularly against technically gifted opponents, Lobanovskyi would have his sides perform the full-press early to rattle them, after which false pressing would often be enough to induce a mistake – and often, of course, his side would be comfortably ahead after the period of full-pressing.

Next year, that should be the Arsenal game plan. We have one of the fittest teams in the league, as evident in all the late goals, and they should be able to press, not fully for 90 minutes, but press enough that they can win the ball back, as Arsenal try and conquer the last divide that separates them from Barcelona (aside from Barcelona having much more technically gifted players than us).

The Revival of 4-2-4

Recently, the two teams playing pass and move football, Barcelona and Arsenal, have switched to a 4-2-4 variation formation. And with Arsenal only 3 points behind Chelsea, and Barcelona joint top in Spain, and in the semi finals of the European Cup, there is a good chance that a major competition could be won by a team playing 4-2-4 for the first time since 1970.
What Happened to 4-2-4?
The problem with 4-2-4 is that the midfield gets overrun fairly easily. While it worked during the 60s, and fairly early 70s many managers realised that when possession was lost, it was increasingly difficult to win possession back. Because of this reason, 4-4-2, developed independently of each other in Russia and England by Viktor Maslor and Alf Ramsey. Argentina too, played a 4 man diamond. The death bell was sounding for 4-2-4, and Rinus Michels joined other managers when he realised that 4-2-4 would not work for Ajax. He played 4-3-3, and in the 1974 Final, both teams, Holland and West Germany, played 4-3-3. The age of the 4-2-4 was over, and teams were moving to 4-4-2, catenaccio or giocco al'Italia, 4-5-1, 4-3-3, or the newest formation, 3-5-2, that was developed in 1986 by Carlos Bilardo. In that final, West Germany played 5-3-2, and, as Jonathan Wilson put it, the pyramid was inverted. The days of the 4-2-4 and it's free scoring were over, as the 1990 World Cup had one of the lowest amounts of goals in it. FIFA outlawed the backpass and the tackle from behind, but the 4-2-4 still looked very dead.
4-2-3-1
Yet 4-2-4 was not dead. In fact, did it even die?
One of the last teams to successfully play 4-2-4 was Brazil 1970. However, with Jairzinho and Rivellino playing slightly behind Tostao, and Pele dropping off, what was their formation but 4-2-3-1? 4-2-3-1 is just a slight variation of 4-3-3 or 4-5-1; if it's 4-3-3, just have the wingers drop back a little, and have a midfielder advance, and it becomes 4-2-3-1. Or, it was a variation of 4-4-2; have a striker drop back, wingers push up, and you have 4-2-3-1. The credit in Spain for inventing 4-2-3-1 goes to Juan Manuel Lillo when he was in charge of 3rd Division Cultural Leonesa in 1991/92; it was transported to England when Manchester United adopted the formation after losing to Real Madrid in 2000, though Alex Ferguson claimed he has always played with split forwards. France won Euro 2000 with it, and 4-2-3-1 is now a fairly common formation; looking at the Guardian's Squad Sheets for the weekend's games, Liverpool, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City are all expected to line up in that formation, and England, once the standard bearer for 4-4-2 has now switched to 4-2-3-1. And with 4 defenders, 2 midfielders and 4 attacking players, what is 4-2-3-1 but 4-2-4?
Arsenal and Barcelona
That brings us to Arsenal and Barcelona. Both teams independently came to their 4-2-4 variants after some problems with their preferred 4-3-3. For Arsenal, as described here, the issue was being suspect to counter attacks after defeats to United and Chelsea. Abou Diaby dropped back into the midfield, the wingers drop slightly deeper and Cesc Fabregas played like a ponta da lanca, off of Nikclas Bendtner (that role is now Samir Nasri's after Fabregas' injury). This article in Zonal Marking covers Barcelona's switch; here, Lionel Messi drops back, Andres Iniesta pushes up, and either Zlatan Ibrahimovic or Thierry Henry plays as the number 9, with Henry being more of a false 9. Both are fairly similar, except that with Barcelona's formation, it was a midfielder being pushed up on the left, and Messi, they're most creative player dropping into that playmaker's role, while at Arsenal, it was Fabregas playing in the playmaker's role. Both formations could easily be described as 4-2-3-1, and maybe they should be, but with the 4 attackers being higher up than they would be in a 4-2-3-1 (which can be attributed to the amount of possession both teams have), it's more accurate to describe them as 4-2-4, which, as a formation is having it's swansong before it sweeps into obsolescence for the final time.

Denilson's great game

Denilson scored a goal on Saturday, but was still somewhat underrated. However, despite not playing a deadly ball like Cesc Fabregas does, he kept possession well, and made 73 passes, all of which were successful. He also won 6 out of 10 tackles, and also made 3 interceptions.
Denilson gets some criticsim from Arsenal supporters, some deserved, but mostly underserved, and you can see why he's played: not only does he have a nice 30 yard shot, but he keeps the ball well, which was important against 10 men, and will be important in 8 days time against Barcelona.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Positioning v Porto

The Telegraph have players average positioning graphic in their match reports, and looking at Tuesday's, I find it very interesting that Nasri, Eboue and Bendtner all occupied the same area. This shows that Bendtner was dropping deep, either defensively or to pick up the ball from midfield, and it also shows Nasri's role meant he was able to play right behind Bendtner, with Song and Diaby giving midfield cover.

Arsene Wenger gets the tactics right as Arsenal hammer Porto

Arsenal went through to the quarter final with a 5-0 victory, which at times wasn't as comfortable as the scoreline suggested. Samir Nasri and Emmanuel Eboue's goals 90 seconds of football apart made the final 20 minutes routine.

Arsene Wenger went with Samir Nasri in the Fabregas role as expected, and Arshavin, Diaby, Song, Campbell and Sagna came in for Fabregas, Walcott, Denilson, Silvestre and Eboue. Arshavin on the left was big, as it gave Nasri the freedom to roam behind Nicklas Bendtner, and Arshavin provided another creative option in the absence of Fabregas. It was Nasri who found Arshavin before the ball rebounded to Bendtner for the first goal. Arshavin was involved for the second goal; Fucile gave the ball away, and Arshavin's brilliant run then cross found Bendtner to tap in. 2-0 25 minutes in, and it looked smooth sailing. However, Porto pushed back; while they didn't threaten that much (Nasri cleared one of the line just before scoring), they held the ball, and forced Arsenal to give it away. That all changed in the 62nd minute, when Nasri got the ball from Diaby, cut inside, beat 3 defenders and finished with aplomb. It was a brilliant goal, and Nasri's freedom to roam allowed him to get into position. Also, the training that Arsene Wenger has Arsenal do, like keeping the ball in tight spaces really came out in this goal.
Arsenal's fourth than came 90 seconds of football later; Porto's corner was headed clear by Clichy, Arshavin broke and played in Eboue who was steaming forward, Eboue than took it round the keeper and finished with his left foot. Porto were beaten, Arsenal spent the next 20 mintues controlling the ball, and we got our 5th when Eboue was tugged down in the area. Bendtner completed his hat trick with a good penalty, and the hat trick will do him good after the misses against Burnley.
At time Arsenal's play wasn't the best; we gave the ball away a lot, but we ruined Porto's gameplan within 10 minutes, and we were clinical.
Arshavin on the left gave space to the midfield trio of Nasri, Song and Diaby. Song in Paticular was getting forward more than usual.
Defensively, Vermaelen was excellent as usual, and Campbell had some dodgy moments due to his lack of pace, but knew what he was doing. Clichy had one nervy moment, but both he and Sagna were good going forward. Almunia still needs to work on kicking. Bendtner showed again that he does get into good spaces. Also Eboue's corners were surprisingly impressive and more dangerous than the usual corners that we have.
So, Arsenal are in the last 8 of Europe for the third straight year, and unlike the last 2 years, we still have the league to fight for.
Possession: 54%
Shots: 17
On Target: 12
Passing: 80% successful

Samir Nasri can replace Cesc Fabregas

Cesc Fabregas came off against Burnely with a tight hamstring, and Arsene Wenger might take a gamble to play him against Porto. Personally I think he will be on the bench like he was against Aston Villa.
Update: Cesc Fabregas is out for the game against Porto, Arsene Wenger confirmed today.

Samir Nasri stepped into his role after he went off against Burnley, and it was Nasri who set up Cesc's goal. Nasri can step into that role again Tuesday night against Porto. Nasri has the best control and passing after Fabregas. Also, the shift in Arsenal's formation can also help Nasri come into that role.
Cesc Fabregas opens the scoring against Burnley after a sparking Samir Nasri chip.


As noted in an earlier article, Arsenal's formation has changed. Instead of one deeper player and two players going forward, Fabregas is now the highest playing midfielder midfielder with Song and Diaby deeper lying, Song deeper on the right hand side, which has allowed Eboue or Sagna to get forward as displayed against Sunderland and Burnley. Diaby will attack more than Song, but is deep enough to cover for the full backs on counter attacks. With Nasri being better defensively than Tomas Rosicky, he played in the Diaby role on Saturday, but move to Fabregas' role after Diaby replaced Fabregas. Fabregas' new role is playing as an attacking midfielder, sometimes appearing right off Bendtner as a ponta da lança in what was almost a 4-2-4, but better described as a 4-2-Fabregas-3. Nasri, who is a player who has played in that role before, off the striker, for Arsenal, Marseille and France. With his passing and control skills he is the obvious choice to replace Fabregas, and also has the creativity to support Bendtner. Arshavin, who has returned, is the favourite for the left wing position, and with Eboue and Walcott impressing they can also play on the right, along with Tomas Rosicky. At least Porto, and Hull City if Fabrgas is out for that long, Arsenal should play a 4-2-Nasri-3.

Pressing, Lobanovskyi and Arsene Wenger

Many liken Arsenal to Barcelona; we share the same 4-3-3 formation, and a similar passing game. But there is something else that is similar between the two sides; pressing. Pressing is important to Barcelona as shown by this Pep Guardiola quote from the Champions League final

Without the ball, we are a horrible team. We need the ball, so we pressed high up the pitch to win the ball back early.

Watching Arsenal without the ball, it is easy to say the same thing. This year, Arsenal have been pressing, though they pressed much better earlier in the year. The pressing led to the plethora of goals earlier in the year, and Arsenal showed their pressing side against Stoke, when they rarely had the ball in our own half.

Pressing as we know it, for long periods of time, was invented simultaneously by Rinus Michels at Ajax and by Valeryi Lobanovskyi at Dynamo Kyiv. Arsene Wenger's sides are usually compared to to the Ajax side of the 70s, but Lobanovskyi's scientific and mathematical approach is comparable to Arsene Wenger himself, who in training, times how long each players takes in receiving the ball and passing it. Lobanovskyi's approach was somewhat different, and was explained in Inverting the Pyramid by Jonathan Wilson. Lobanovskyi set target actions for each player in pressing and for what I believe, actions for his team.

While it is hard to apply that table to Arsenal (more teams press now, and Arsenal play scintillating and free scoring football, while Dynamo Kyiv were more result based) its concept can be applied. When pressing, you want to have more tackles, interceptions and passes in the opposition half than in your own half, and Arsenal tend to do so . So, one can say that Arsenal's tactics of pressing and passing originate from Ajax and Dynamo Kyiv.

Shift in the Formation

After the Man United and Chelsea games, where Arsenal conceded 3 of the 5 goals on counter attacks, Arsene Wenger made a slight tactical shift in the 4-3-3 formation. 2 of the midfielders, Diaby and Song against Liverpool, and Ramsey and Song against Sunderland now playing a deeper role, with Fabregas playing further forward.

by Guardian Chalkboards
Diaby dropped back against Liverpool



The formation is now basically a 4-2-3-1, or a 4-2-1-3, with Fabregas in the hole. That is a role that he didn't play well in towards the end of last year, but this year he has developed into a more rounded player, as Arsene Wenger remarked:

He is a complete midfielder.

"He has become a complete midfielder because he can defend now, he has kept his vision and I believe he has added some physical power to his game.

"If you compare Fabregas two years ago and today, physically they are completely different.

Song still remains the slightly deeper player, but has shifted to the right of the midfield, which gives the full back leeway to get forward, as Eboue did last Saturday. At times it has appeared that Fabregas is playing as a striker, or at least a ponta da lança, and as the front line is missing creativity with no Van Persie or Arshavin, Fabrgas playing that high can effective.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Seen here, Fabregas is playing much higher than Song against Sunderland, almost as a striker.

Eboue is a?

Emmanuel Eboue was arguably the most influential player last Saturday against Sunderland. He set up Bendtner’s first goal and was a thorn on Sunderland’s left side throughout the entire game.
In Inverting the Pyramid, Jonathan Wilson makes the point that space is the most important part of football tactics, and tactics evolve to find space. This can be found in the Total Football tactics of the 1970s, where Ajax made the pitch big when they had the ball and made the space smaller when they didn’t by pressing the opposition. Arsene Wenger has admitted to being an admirer of the Ajax sides of the period, and Arsenal are often thought of as a total football side. In The Guardian series The Question, Wilson argues that the full back has become the player with the most space available. If Sunderland had actually played a 4-3-3, they may have been able to counter Eboue’s runs, but when they played 4-5-1, they allowed Eboue to run, and easily beat Darren Bent, which he did for the first goal. Eboue kept making these runs, and was the most dangerous player, and should have been named man of the match. It’s a far cry from last year where some cringed when he played. And it provokes a question about him: If he’s so effective going forward, should he start ahead of Bacary Sagna?

The answer is that he shouldn’t. While Eboue is good going forward, Sagna is much better defensively. Eboue is suspect defensively (see the game against Wigan last year when he was booed off). Not that Eboue shouldn’t play; he is an excellent squad player, and is good off the bench on the right of the front three. Though not as good starting in the front three, he has been effective off the bench at that position when the opposition have tired. So, if Eboue shouldn’t start ahead of Sagna, and shouldn’t start up front, when should he start? The start against Sunderland showed that he should start against weaker teams who come to the Emirates with a defensive formation and will allow Eboue the space from right back. Also, if Song and Diaby/Ramsey continue to play a slightly deeper role then they have, he can be assured that he’ll be covered if he goes forward.